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GOING UNCONVENTIONAL IN FOREIGN-EXCHANGE INTERVENTIONS
Marcelo M Prates
I.

ARE CENTRAL BANKS ALLOWED TO PLAY WITH DERIVATIVES?

Derivatives are well known for their instability.' For a long period, especially after
the 2008 financial crisis, derivatives were viewed as "time bombs" and dangerous "financial
weapons of mass destruction." 2 Stability, however, lies at the core of central banking.
Central banks around the world have a mandate to maintain monetary and, in some cases,
financial stability.3 How then can a central bank use this unstable tool to achieve stability?
The contradiction here is only apparent.
Derivatives are not necessarily a source of evil; they are instead a powerful riskmanagement tool. 4 Derivatives help to make the future more predictable by matching
counterparties with opposite exposures, thereby making both parties less exposed to
volatility. 5 On a large scale, the use of derivatives to hedge positions contributes to the
6
overall stability by soothing expectations. Hedging, however, can turn into speculation, and
the difference between the two trading activities may be difficult to notice at times.' But the
instrument itself is not the main culprit. Investors, even when not engaging in purely
speculative trading, can use a variety of tools in the quest for higher returns, derivatives being
just one such tool.8 When bets go wrong and a crisis arises, derivatives will bring bad news.
Killing the messenger, though, is hardly ever the best solution.
Engaging in derivatives, moreover, may be the best way, if not the only way, to
9
counteract derivatives themselves, speculative or not. The Brazilian experience in the early
2000's is illustrative of this notion."o In 2002, the Brazilian currency was suffering a

'LL.M. 2015 and S.J.D. 2018, Duke University School of Law. Lawyer at the Central Bank of Brazil. The
views and opinions expressed here are mine and do not reflect the position or policy of any of the institutions
with which I am affiliated. For comments, please contact marcelo.prates@bcb.gov.br.
1 See Gunther Capelle-Blancard
INTERNATIONALE 67-89 (2010).

Are Derivatives Dangerous? A

Literature Survey,
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2 The now-famous expressions were used by Warren Buffet in 2002. See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.,

ANNUAL REP. at 13, 15 (2002).
3 MILTON FRIEDMAN & CHARLES A. E. GOODHART, INFLATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE

CENTRAL BANK 91-109 (2002).
4 For an illustration of how derivatives can be misrepresented, especially in media coverage, see generally P.
Huang, Kimberly Krawiec & Frank Partnoy, Derivatives on TV: A tale of two derivatives debacles in primetime. 4 GREEN BAG 257 (2001).
5 Id.
6 See generally PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION (3d ed. 2004).

Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New FinancialBingo ": A Risk-Based'Approach to Understanding
Derivatives, 23 J. OF CORP. L. 1 (1997).
8 See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 6, at 117-29, 123-29; Krawiec, supra note 7, at 4-5.
See Gustavo H. B. Franco, The Real Plan and The Exchange Rate, 217 ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN. 55-58 (2000).
1n Mdrcio Garcia & Tony Volpon, DNDFs: A More Efficient Way to Intervene in FX Markets, 621 PUC Rio
Dep't de Econ. at 1-4 (2014).
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continuous depreciation, although foreign direct investment remained high and no sign of
significant capital outflows were present." The situation indicated that the higher demand for
United States ("U.S.") dollars was coming from the domestic market, where participants had
started to use derivatives more extensively to deal with exchange-rate variations.' 2 Many
participants were then buying U.S. dollars in the spot market to balance their exposure in the
derivatives market. This situation accelerated the depreciation of the national currency. 3
The interventions of the Central Bank of Brazil ("BCB") in the spot market aggravated the
vicious circle, as the BCB was selling U.S. dollars to curb the pace of the depreciation.14 It
became necessary to find a way to appropriately treat both those in need of foreign currency
and those searching for hedging.'"
Instead of insisting on a policy of using foreign reserves to avoid excessive
exchange-rate volatility, the BCB also started using derivatives to intervene in the foreignexchange ("FX") market-the BCB FX swap.1 6 At the first auction, on March 27, 2002, the
BCB offered to buy 9,000 contracts of US$50,000.00 each, with the initial date set for April
11, 2002, and the expiration date set to January 21, 2004.'7 The first swap operation had a
small global amount with a long maturity. Many years later, this additional tool for
intervention in the FX market has increased in volume and significance.'" By the end of 2015,
2.1 million swap contracts were outstanding in the Brazilian derivatives market, with an
aggregate notional amount of more than US$108 billion-around 7% of Brazilian Gross
Domestic Product ("GDP").19 The longevity and size of the swap operations indicate their
importance for the BCB, making the BCB FX swap a relevant topic of research and debate to
this date.20
The existing literature looks at the BCB FX swap through economic lenses,21
whereas this paper approaches the topic from a legal perspective. This paper asserts that the

Id.
12 See generally BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, INFLATION REP.: CREDIT, MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES

(2002), http://www.bcb.gov.br/htms/relinf/ing/2002/03/ri200203c3i.pdf
13
14

Id.
This situation is observed in other emerging markets as well, as pointed out by Herman Kamil, Is Central

Bank Intervention Effective Under Inflation Targeting Regimes? The Case of Colombia 29 (IMF Working
Paper WP/08/88, Apr. 2008), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Is-Central-BankIntervention-Effective-Under-Inflation-Targeting-Regimes-The-Case-of-Colombia-21852.
15 Garcia & Volpon, supra note 10, at 4-6.
16 The use of FX swaps by the BCB came also as a response to a limitation created by Lei Complementar no
101, de 4 de maio de 2000, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 5.5.2000 (Braz.), known as Law of Fiscal
Responsibility. Under this Law, the BCB lost the legal authority to issue public bonds (Article 34). The BCB,
therefore, could not issue NBCE (Nota do Banco Central do Brasil Sdrie Especial) anymore. NBCE was a
bond indexed to the exchange-rate variation that offered the market protection against sudden appreciation or
depreciation of the national currency, helping the BCB to manage currency volatility.
'7

Id. at 53-55.

18 Id.

19 BM&FBOVESPA (n.d.), Reports. Derivatives. Open interest. Type of contract,SCS:Dollar Swap (OCI) (Dec.

30, 2015).
20 Id.

See, e.g., Afonso Bevilaqua & Rodrigo Azevedo, Provision ofFX Hedge by the Public Sector: the Brazilian
Experience (BIS Papers No. 24 at 119-126, 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap24i.pdf; Marcos
21
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BCB FX swap can be a valuable instrument of monetary and exchange-rate policies. The
swap can be used together with more traditional tools-like open-market operations, FX
interventions in the spot market, and even capital controls-to improve the effectiveness of
central banks' actions. A central bank taking part in the derivatives market, however, can be
troublesome at times. Several risks are at stake not only for the counterparties engaging in the
operation, but also for the market as a whole. A governmental agency acting to implement
public policies and holding a multibillion-dollar exposure in the derivatives market is never
just another counterparty.
For countries in need of an additional tool to manage currency volatility, the risks
may be worth taking.22 By 2000, most countries had moved to a flexible exchange-rate
system, 23 acknowledging the inevitability of capital mobility across borders and focusing on
24
With the "policy trilemma"
attaining price stability through autonomous monetary policy.
apparently solved-an economic model posing that any country can only achieve two out of
these three objectives: fixed exchange rate, monetary autonomy, and free movement of
capital 25-these countries would let the national currency float and intervene in the FX
market just to avoid excessive volatility. But the significant capital flows resulting from the
unconventional measures adopted to stimulate growth after the 2008 financial crisis renewed
26
the debate on the "trilemma" and on the need for further intervention in the FX market. To
preserve monetary-policy autonomy in times of extensive financial globalization, every
27
instrument that can be used to soften the effects of global capital flows matters.
The paper begins with a schematic overview of Brazil's monetary and exchange-rate
policies, as well as the corresponding legal structure. The paper next describes the swap
developed by the BCB to compare it with swaps commonly used by market participants,
teasing out characteristics specific to the BCB FX swap. From there, the paper discusses the

Chamon, Marcio Garcia & Laura Souza, FXInterventions in Brazil: a Synthetic Control Approach (PUC-Rio,
Department of Economics, "Texto para discussio" No. 630, February 2015), http://www.econ.pucrio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td630.pdf; Randall Dodd & Stephany Griffith-Jones, Brazil's Derivatives
Markets: Hedging, Central Bank Intervention and Regulation (unpublished, Dec. 19, 2007),
http://www.stephanygj.net/papers.html; Garcia & Volpon, supra note 8; Emanuel Kohlscheen & Sandro C.
Andrade, Official Interventions through Derivatives: Affecting the Demand for Foreign Exchange (Braz.
Central Bank, Working Paper No. 317, July 2013), http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps317.pdf. See also,
for a general perspective, Mario L Blejer & Liliana Schumacher, Central Banks Use of Derivatives and Other
Contingent L iabilities: Analytical Issues and Policy Implications (IMF Working Paper, WP/00/66 March
2000), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0066.pdf.
22 See generally Over-the Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and Reduce
Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Securities, Insurance, and Investment, 116' Cong. (2009),
https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/ CHRG-ll l shrg54589/pdflCHRG-1 11 shrg54598.pdf
23 Nikkei, IMFfinds more countries adopting managedfloating exchange rate system, NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW
(Aug 19, 2014, 14:00), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Forex/IMF-finds-more-countries-adoptingmanaged-floating-exchange-rate-system. The notable exception is found in the countries that have adopted the
euro, sacrificing, since 1999, monetary autonomy for a fixed exchange rate.
24 See, e.g., H616ne Rey, Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Monetary Policy Independence,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECONOMIC POLICY SYMPOSIUM 285 (2013).
25 See generally MAURICE OBSTFELD & ALAN TAYLOR, GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: INTEGRATION, CRISIS,
AND GROWTH (2004).
26
27

See Rey, supra note 24.
Id. at 285-326.

187

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

3

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

legal issues and risks that arise when a central bank uses this type of derivative. By way of
conclusion, the paper considers how a swap similar to the BCB FX swap could prove
valuable to countries as different as Switzerland, Argentina, Venezuela, and China.
II.

THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZiL ON MONETARY AND
EXCHANGE-RATE POLICIES

Law No. 4.595, enacted at the end of 1964, organizes and regulates the financial
system in Brazil. 28 Although it originally passed as an "ordinary law," Law No. 4.595 is
considered a "supplementary law" since the Federal Constitution of 1988 was promulgated.29
The change in status-from "ordinary" to "supplementary"-means that an absolute majority
vote of both houses of the National Congress (Chamber of Deputies and Federal Senate) is
required for a "supplementary law" to pass or modify.o An "ordinary law," in contrast, is
passed or modified by the vote of a simple majority of deputies and senators if an absolute
majority of the members of each house is present in the sessions. 3
Law No. 4.595 created not only the BCB, but also the National Monetary Council
("CMN"). The CMN is responsible for policymaking, notably for formulating the monetary,
credit, exchange-rate, and regulatory policies based on general rules enacted by the legislative
and executive branches and also on international standards. 32 The BCB acts to implement
and enforce these policies, while also supervising the nation's banking and financial systems
to ensure their safety and soundness and to tackle systemic risk.33
In 1999, the legal framework for executing monetary and exchange-rate policies was
overhauled.3 4 In January, Brazil abandoned the currency peg to the U.S. dollar and started
adopting a flexible exchange-rate system, even though the BCB can use FX interventions to
manage excessive currency volatility.3 5 In June of the same year, following the exit from the
36
exchange-rate peg, Brazil adopted an inflation-targeting regime.
Under this regime, the
BCB is authorized to set a short-term interest rate benchmark and to use monetary tools,

28

Lei No. 4.595, de 31 de dezembro de 1964, DLARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 311.1965

29

Understanding

the

National

Monetary

Council,

BANCO

CENTRAL

https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/cmn/entendaocmn-en.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
30 CONSTITUIQAo FEDERAL [C.F.] arf. 69, https:www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil
31 C.F. art. 47.
32 Understanding

the

National

Monetary

Council,

BANCO

CENTRAL

Do

BRASIL,

2014.pdf.
Do

BRASI

https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/cmn/entendaocmnen.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
3 C.F. art. 164 (Regarding the legal mandate of the BCB, Article 164 of the Federal Constitution is also
relevant, because it sets the authority of the central bank to issue currency, make loans to financial institutions,
and purchase and sell government securities to manage the money supply. The BCB, however, is not the direct
supervisor of insurance companies and pension funds. Securities regulation and the related supervision also fall
outside the responsibilities of the BCB. Regarding, however, the supervision of certain financial institutions
that operate in the Brazilian securities market, the BCB shares some regulatory functions with the primary
agency that supervises that market.).
34 Arminio Fraga, Monetary Policy During the Transition to a Floating Exchange Rate: Brazil's Recent

Experience, INT'L MONETARY FuND, https://www.imf org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/fraga.htm.
3 See BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, Comunicado No. 6.565 (Jan. 18, 1999).
36 See DECRETO No. 3.088, art. 1, Braz. (Jun. 21, 1999) (Establishing the system of "inflation target" as a

guideline for the monetary policy regime and other measures).
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3
mainly open-market operations, to pursue the benchmark. ' Therefore, the primary goal of
38
the BCB is to meet the inflation target that the CMN sets in advance.
Additionally, in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis, the BCB was authorized to
39
At that time,
provide liquidity assistance also in U.S. dollars through the discount window.
in the
participants
for
it
hard
made
that
a
situation
scale,
a
global
on
frozen
markets were
40
can
the
BCB
resort,
of
last
As
a
lender
dollars.
in
U.S.
funds
obtain
to
financial markets
the
borrower
as
as
long
of
liquidity,
need
in
institutions
financial
to
loans
offer short-term
41
If the financial institution grants a collateral
presents enough collateral to secure the loan.
to make the loan not in the Brazilian
authority
the
BCB
has
the
dollars,
U.S.
denominated in
42
reserves.
FX
the
from
dollars
in
U.S.
directly
currency, but

THE BCB FX SwAP: KEY FEATURES

III.

A.

Legal Mandate

On March 26, 2002, the CMN edited Resolution No. 2.939, which provides the legal
43
It is a short Resolution
mandate for the BCB to operate with swaps in FX interventions.
consisting of only three articles." The first provision, Article 1, authorizes the BCB "to
perform, with the aim of conducting monetary and exchange-rate policies, swap operations
45
At least two relevant
based on interest rate and on the variation of the exchange rate."
considerations arise from the specific language of Article 1.
First, the BCB is authorized to perform only swap operations based on two different
46
Such restrictive language
underlying references, that is, interest rates and exchange rates.
renders the BCB unable to use other types of derivatives, like futures or options, in FX
47
The restriction
interventions, or to use swaps based on different underlying references.
would not be as strong if the term "swap operations" could be interpreted in a broader sense,
48
This broad use
without a direct connection to the economic meaning of the expression.
appears, for instance, in the American regulation of derivatives, in which the term "swap" is

3 Id.
38
3

Id.
Under Medida Provis6ria [Provisional Measure] No. 442, enacted by the President of Brazil on October 6,

2008, and later on turned into Law No. 11.882.
See Ramon Moreno, Central Bank Instruments to Deal with the Effects of the Crisis on Emerging Market

4

Economies,

54

BANK

INT'L

PAPERS

SETTLEMENT

73-74

73,

(2011),

https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap54d.pdf.
41 See Medida Provis6ria No. 442, supra note 39.
42 Id.
CENTRAL
BANCO
2.939,
No.
Resolugfo
https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res/2002/pdfres2939
* Id.
4s Id.
4

DO

BRASIL

(Mar.

26,

2002),

(Mar.

26,

2002),

vlO.pdf.

46Id.

47 Resolugho

No.

2.939,

BANCO

CENTRAL

DO

BRASIL

https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res/2002/pdf/res-2939-v1_O.pdf.
48 Id.
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used in a general way and encompasses different types of derivatives. 49 Even so, the
limitation on the underlying references that the BCB can use to construct the derivative would
still be unavoidable. Second, the BCB was authorized to use swaps not only to intervene in
the FX market with the goal of conducting exchange-rate policy, but also to execute monetary
policy. 50 Although the BCB has been using swap operations within the FX market, nothing
prevents the BCB from using swap operations also to stabilize prices and control inflation."
The sole paragraph of the referred Article 1, in turn, provides that the BCB should
operate in the derivatives market and trade on organized exchanges like any other participant.
In Brazil, the leading exchange is the BM&FBovespa S.A.-Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e
Futuros, now B3,52 a private entity that runs the securities and derivatives markets 53 in a
natural-monopoly situation.5 4 So, in the swap operations, the BCB observes all the conditions
and requirements established by the BM&FBovespa.55 The BCB uses standardized contracts,
posts initial margin (usually government securities), makes daily adjustments of position
(variation margin), and even responds to margin calls if a daily adjustment reduces the margin
deposited below the minimum required level. 56
In the related rule-making process, on March 26, 2002, the BCB issued Circular No.
3.099, which defines what the BCB FX swap operations are and stipulates how they work.17
Article I of Circular No. 3.099 defines BCB FX swaps as operations to be settled at a future
date involving the exchange of the differential ("spread") that results from applying the
effective interest rate and the exchange-rate variation against amounts to receive and to pay.
The definition might be considered somewhat convoluted, especially after being translated
into English. But the definition merely describes a swap operation with its two legs: one of
the counterparties is exposed to the risk of the Brazilian base interest rate, and the other is
exposed to the exchange-rate risk related to the price of U.S. dollar ("USD" or "US$") in
terms of Brazilian real ("BRL" or "R$"). 9 A closer look at the standard contract of the BCB
FX swap will help clarify the operation and its mechanics.

49 See GARY E. KALBAUGH, DERIVATIVES LAW AND REGULATION 71-77
(2014).
5o See generally Derivatives markets in Brazil, BIS QUARTERLY

REVIEW

(Dec.

11,

2016),

https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/rqtl612x.htm.
id.
CME
Group
Strategic
Partnership
with
B3,
CME
GROUP,
https://www.cmegroup.com/intemational/partnership-resources/bmfbovespa-resources.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2019).
s3 See Who we are: One of the World's Leading Financial Market Infrastructure Companies, B3,
http://www.b3.com.br/ptbr/b3/institucional/quem-somos/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
54 Dodd & Griffith-Jones, supra note 21.
51

52

55 BM&FBOVESPA, supra note 19.
56 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS AND INT'L ORG. SEC. COMMISSIONS, SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT:
MARGIN
REQUIREMENTS
FOR
NON-CENTRALLY
CLEARED
DERIVATIVES
10
(2013),

https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD403.pdf
" Circular
No.
3099,
BANCO
CENTRAL

DO

BRASIL

(Mar.

2002),

https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/busca/downloadNormativo.asp?arquivo=/Lists/Normativos/Attachment

s/46940/Circ_3099_viO.pdf.
58 id.
59 Id.
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B.

Mechanics

The standard contract the BCB currently uses in the swap operations is named "U.S.
Dollar Swap with Reset Referencing One-Day Repurchase Agreements," and the ticker for
negotiations and quotations is SCS ("SCS contracts"). SCS contracts are sold or bought by
the BCB at auctions in which only financial institutions are allowed to participate. After
closing the transaction with the BCB, the financial institutions can offer the SCS contracts
within the organized exchange, the BM&FBovespa, to their customers or to other financial
institutions, creating a secondary market for the BCB FX swaps.
The original trade of the BCB FX swap is performed in a transparent and
straightforward fashion. Usually, the BCB issues a Comunicado, an announcement informing
6
The
the market that, on the next day, the BCB will promote an auction of SCS contracts.
Comunicado also reveals how many contracts will be offered, what their initial and expiration
dates are, and which position the BCB will take in the contracts with respect to the interest
rate-long (buying contracts) or short (selling contracts).62 The SCS contracts maturity can
range from thirty days to several years, depending on the demand from the market and on the
63
strategy the BCB is willing to pursue in a particular period.
At the opening of the auction, each financial institution presents up to five bids,
which will be used to create the value of the initial coupon.64 The financial institution also
informs the BCB the number of contracts the institution is willing to negotiate. 65 The BCB,
based on the offers presented, announces the minimum value for the bid that will be
accepted." In the end, all bids that offered a value equal to or higher than the minimum value
set by the BCB are accepted. The minimum value, however, is applied to all winning offers;
From the
so that all contracts negotiated at a certain date have the same initial coupon.
initial date of the SCS contract until the day before its expiration date, the SCS contract can
be freely traded on the secondary market, within the designated exchange. 68

6 See BANCo CENTRAL DO BRASIL, INFLATION REP., supra note 12.
61 See generally Kohlscheen & Andrade, supra note 21.
62 See Comunicado No. 27.558, BANCO CENTRAL DO BRAsE. (Mar. 30, 2015).

See US. Dollar Swap with Reset Referencing One-Day Repurchase Agreements: Specifications, BRASIL
BOLSA BALCAO, http://www.b3.com.br/en-us/products-and-services/trading/interest-rates/u-s-dollar-swapwith-reset-referencing-one-day-repurchase-agreements.htn (last visited May 5, 2019).
6 In Portuguese, the coupon of that transaction is known as "cupom cambial" ["exchange-rate coupon"],
which is usually equivalent to the differential ("spread") between the effective base interest rate in Brazil,
known as Selic, and the exchange-rate variation (USD/BRL) in a given period. In a general perspective, the
"cupom cambial" is the interest rate charged in operations that take place in Brazil, but involve assets
denominated in U.S. dollars. The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a typical example of "cupom
cambial" used in Brazil. About the "cupom cambial", see generally Mark R. Stone, W. Christopher Walker,
Yosuke Yasui, From Lombard Street to Avenida Paulista: Foreign Exchange Liquidity Easing in Brazil in
Response to the Global Shock of 2008-09 5 (1MF Working Paper WP/09/259, Nov. 2009),
&

63

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09259.pdf.
65 Id.

6 Id.
67 See BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASH., INFLATION REP., supra note 12.
68 See BM&FBOVESPA, supra note 19.
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Some basic definitions used in the contract, as the referred "initial coupon," should
be highlighted to clarify the contract mechanics:
Initial Value ("IV"): Final Value of the contract discounted by the Initial Coupon
("IC") negotiated between the counterparties during the SCS contracts auction;
Final Value ("FV"): the notional amount of the contract, US$50,000.00;
Current Coupon Value ("CCV"): IV of the contract indexed to the Current
Coupon ("CC"). And the Current Coupon is the result of the differential ("spread")
between the effective base interest rate (known as Selic in Brazil) 69 and the
exchange-rate variation (Aexr) for each period beginning on the initial date of the
transaction. The value of the exchange-rate variation is positive when the national
currency depreciates, and negative when the national currency appreciates;
Final Coupon Value ("FCV"): Initial Value of the contract indexed to the effective
base interest rate (Selic) for the period;
Purchase of a Contract: entering into a long position in interest rate (Selic}-and,
into a short position in U.S. dollars. Here, the purchaser acquires the right to receive
the CCV-the floating leg-and the obligation to pay the FV, which is the notional
amount of the contract, US$50,000.00-the fixed leg. The BCB purchases SCS
contracts when it wants to offer liquidity to the foreign-exchange market, thus
avoiding a sharp depreciation of the national currency. This operation is known as a
"traditional swap"; 7 0
Sale of a Contract: entering into a short position in interest rate (Selic)-and, on
the other hand, into a long position in U.S. dollars. Here the seller acquires the right
to receive the FV, which is the notional amount of the contract, US$50,000.00-the
fixed leg, and the obligation to pay the CCV-the floating leg. The BCB sells SCS
contracts when it wants to curb the sudden appreciation of the national currency.
This operation is known as a "reverse swap";7 1

The effective Selic rate, based on the interest rate used in one-day repurchase agreements, is defined
in the
model SCS contract as the "adjusted average daily financing rate calculated by the Special System for
Settlement and Custody (SELIC) for federal securities. Daily financing is considered for transactions with
69

federal securities in custody with SELIC and in systems managed by clearing houses or clearing and settlement
service providers covered by Law 10.214/2001."
7o As explained by Kohlscheen & Andrade, supra note 21, at 11, if "the Central Bank is offering to buy these
derivative contracts the financial institution receives the equivalent of the exchange rate variation over the time
of the contract plus a local onshore US$ interest rate, all paid in BrazilianReais. At the same time, the Central
Bank receives the cumulative interbank interest rate. (. . .) The local market convention has been to label
auctions as traditional swaps when the Central Bank is buying contracts to limit the depreciation of the
Brazilian Real, and as reverse swaps when the Central Bank is selling contracts to limit appreciation of the
currency."
71 Id.
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Settlement: all SCS contracts are settled in cash at their expiration date, and the
settlement is based on the differential between the fixed leg and the floating leg and
also on the position, long or short, each counterparty entered into with respect to the
interest rate. Although the notional amount of the contract and the exposure of the
counterparties are expressed in U.S. dollars, the net obligation of the contract will be
converted into the national currency at the maturity date. As a consequence, the
settlement currency will be Brazilian real.
Since 2013, the BCB has intervened in the FX market with the use of derivatives
72
mostly when facing the depreciation of the national currency. Under this scenario, the BCB
offers liquidity by purchasing SCS contracts ("traditional swap") instead of selling U.S.
73
Because the BCB engages in swap
dollars from the FX reserves in the spot market.
the BCB purchases SCS contracts
currency,
operations to promote the stability of the national
sudden depreciations.7 4 By
against
market
the
with the objective of offering a hedge to
offering this protection, the BCB tries to ease expectations, and, in turn, to avoid excessive
75
demand for U.S. dollars in the spot market. The first step toward this goal is to properly set
7
the value of the Initial Coupon, or IC, during the auction of the SCS contracts. ' The
counterparties will negotiate the IC based on the value of the base interest rate in the national
and foreign markets, on the price of U.S. dollar in the spot market, and on the counterparties'
purposes and projections."
Recall that the Initial Value, or IV, of an SCS contract is equivalent to
US$50,000.00 (the Final Value) discounted by the IC that is negotiated between the
78
The definition of the IV is critical because it is the
counterparties during the auction.
In an ideal scenario of absolute
amount based on which the floating rate will be calculated.
(Selic), and the product would
rate
interest
base
to
the
only
stability, the IV would be indexed
0
rate were expected to be
interest
the
If
Value.s
Coupon
be the final value of the Current
BCB's goal of stability,
the
achieve
to
the
IC,
of
stable during this period, the optimal value
would be discounted at
What
(Selic)."
rate
interest
the
would be close to the current value of

72 See Joao Pedro Scalo Macalos, Foreign Exchange Swaps: a near substitutefor international reserves in
2017),
14,
(Oct.
1
Brazil,
of
case
The
countries?
peripheral
https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/v_2017_11_0macalos.pdf.
7 See generally Chamon, Garcia & Souza, supra note 21.
74 Bevilaqua & Azevedo, supranote 21, at 124.
7 Chamon, Garcia & Souza, supra note 21, at 1-2.
76 Mdrcio Garcia, A macroeconomiado ddlarfuturo[The macroeconomics of the futures price of U.S. dollars].
http://www.economia.puc1997),
(Jun.
4,7
BM&F,
RESENHA
rio.br/Mgarcia/Artigos/Macrometrica/!MACROMT.RIC/macdol.pdf.
n Id.
7 See infra fig. 2.
7 Chamon, Garcia & Souza, supranote 21, at 2.
'o Id. at 4.
" Id. at 6. Even in that case, the Initial Coupon would be close to the actual Selic, but never equal in value, for
two main reasons. First, because they will be charged over different principal amounts, a bigger one in the case
of the Initial Coupon, which is the Final Value. Second, because compound interest will interfere in the value
of the Initial Coupon if the exchange-rate variation is not zero.
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the beginning of the contract from the Final Value (the IC), would be added at the end of an
SCS contract (the Selic interest rate). An illustration helps to elucidate the situation further8 2 :

-

Table 1
Initial scenario: Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum (0.10); US$1.00 = R$2.00
Value of the Initial Coupon (IC) set at the auction = 9.09% per annum (0.0909)
Transaction: BCB buys I contract with Final Value (FV) = US$50,000.00 (notional
amount) -> BCB
receives the Current Coupon Value (CCV) and pays the Final Value
Final scenario (expiration date): Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum (0.10); US$1.00
R$2.00
Net Amount
Payable US$
- each period
t
Fixed leg
(BCB
Initial
Floating
~ rcie
receives
US$
US$
leg
Aexr
Selic
Value US$
positive
.50,000.00
amounts and
pays negative
ones)
Initial
0.10
45,455.00
date
t+0
Expiration
date

-

0.10

0

50,000.50

50,000.00

0.50

Although the described ideal scenario, of absolute stability, may be useful to
demonstrate the importance of setting an adequate value to the IC, this scenario will seldom
occur, especially because of the inherent volatility of the exchange rate. Table 2, then,
simulates the effect of a series of variations on the exchange rate, with a total depreciation of
the national currency of 15.75% at the end of the period, although the interest rate remains
3
stable. 8

82

All rates mentioned in the illustrations throughout the paper are noted on an annual basis to make

comparisons easier.
81 See infra tbl.
2.
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Table 2
Initial scenario: Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum (0.10); US$1.00 = R$2.00
Value of the Initial Coupon (IC) set at the auction = 9.09% per annum (0.0909)
Transaction: BCB buys 1 contra6t with Final Value (FV) = US$50,000.00 (notional
amount) = BCB
receives the Current Coupon Value (CCV) and pays the Final Value
Subsequent scenarios (variation in the exchange rate only):
R$2.10
t+1: Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum; US$1.00
R$2.205
US$1.00
t+2: Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum;
t+ (expiration da e): Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum; US$ .00 = R$2.315
Net Amount
Payable US$
- each period

Initial
date
t+0

45,455.00

Selic

0.10

Floating
lgU$

Aexr

.Fixed

-

leg

(BCB

eceives
Fie
receives
US$
positive
50,000.00
amounts and
pays negative
ones)
-

Initial Value
US$

I

t+1

-

0.10

0.05

47,727.75

50,000.00

-2,272.25

t+2

-

0.10

0.102
5

45,341.36

50,000.00

-2,386.39

0.10

0.157
5

42,841.34

50,000.00

-2,500.02

t+3
(expiratio
n date)
Total
settlement

-7,158.66

Up to this point, the proposed scenarios show that the SCS contracts the BCB uses
to intervene in the FX market can be similar to a futures contract of U.S. dollars. The BCB is
exposed to the exchange-rate variation (short in U.S. dollars), becoming a net payer when the
national currency depreciates. The swap operation, however, is not the exact equivalent of a
futures contract of U.S. dollars, a general idea disseminated in the market." In a futures

8

Kohlscheen & Andrade, supra note 21, at 11. This general idea might have been formed during the first

swap operations, when the purchase of a swap contract was necessarily associated with the purchase of a
Brazilian government security indexed to the base interest rate. See BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, INFLATION
REP., supra note 12 (For a detailed explanation of the combined operations used at the beginning of the swap
operations).
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contract of U.S. dollars, once the counterparties agree on a price to exchange U.S. dollars for
Brazilian real at a future date, only the exchange-rate variation during the contract will affect
each party's financial position. Variations of the base interest rate (Selic) in the period of the
U.S. dollars futures contract will have no influence whatsoever on the gains or losses of the
contracting parties. For the financial result of the SCS contracts, on the other hand, variations
of the base interest rate will be of crucial importance, especially when the variations do not
come in line with what the counterparties originally expected."
To illustrate the difference, Table 3 simulates the effect on an SCS contract of a
series of variations in the exchange rate and also in the base interest rate. 8 6 Table 3
demonstrates that a sharp rise in the benchmark interest rate and, in consequence, in the
effective interest rate could neutralize part of the depreciation of the national currency.8 ' A
rise in the interest rate could even turn the BCB into a net receiver if the exchange rate
remained stable in any given period.

85 MARCOS CARREIRA & RICHARD BROSTOwICz, BRAZiLIAN DERIVATIVES AND SECURITIES: PRICING AND

RISK MANAGEMENT OF FX AND INTEREST-RATE PORTFOLIOS FOR LOCAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS 157, 159,

162 (2016).
6 See infra tbl. 3.
87 id
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Table 3
Initial scenario: Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum (0.10); US$1.00 = R$2.00
Value of the Initial Coupon (IC) set at the auction = 9.09% per annum (0.0909)
Transaction: BCB buys I contract with Final Value (FV) = US$50,000.00
(notional amount) = BCB receives the CurrentCoupon Value (CCV) and pays the Final
Value
Subsequent scenarios:
t+1: Selic (effective rate) = 11% per annum; US$1.00 = R$2.10
t+2: Selic (effective rate) = 13% per annum; US$1.00 = R$2.205
t+3: Selic (effective rate) = 15% per annum; US$1.00 = R$2.315
t+4 (expiration da e): Selic (effective rate)= 16% per annum; US$1.00 = R$2.315
Net Amount
Payable US$
- each period
Floating leg
US$

Initial Value
US$

Initial
date
t+0

Fixed leg
Fie
50,000.00

(BCB
(C
receives
positive
amounts and
pays
negative
ones)

0.10

-

t+1

-

0.11

0.05

48,182.30

50,000.00

-1,817.70

t+2

-

0.13

0.1025

46,705.01

50,000.00

-1,477.29

t+3

-

0.15

0.1575

45,114.09

50,000.00

-1,590.93

50,000.00

454.55

t+4
(expiratio
n date)
Total
settlement

-

0.16

-

0.1575

45,568.64

-

45,455.00

-4,431.36

Although the total exchange-rate variation in the examples of Table 3 is the same
shown in Table 2, 15.75%, the BCB would pay less at the expiration date of the model
contract this time.88 Therefore, the variation of the base interest rate during the period of the
SCS contract plays a major role in the BCB FX swap.
" See supratbl. 3.
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Finally, Table 4 builds on the situations described in Table 3, but, this time, an
appreciation of the national currency is simulated, a circumstance that would require the BCB
to use "reverse swaps."8 9 In this case, the BCB would sell SCS contracts, thus taking a short
position in interest rate (Selic) and a long position in U.S. dollars. The BCB would then
receive from the financial institutions the fixed leg (US$50,000.00) and would pay them the
floating leg (CCV). 90 Here, decreases in the benchmark interest rate can have the effect of
neutralizing part of the appreciation of the national currency.

' See infra tbl. 4.
90 Id.
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Table 4
Initial scenario: Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum (0.10); US$1.00
= R$2.00
Value of the Initial Coupon (ic) set at the auction = 9.09% per annum

(0.0909)
Transaction: BCB sells 1 contract with Final Value (FV)US$50,000.00 (notional amount) = BCB receives the Final Value and pays the
Current Coupon Value (CCV)
Subsequent scenarios:
t+1: Selic (effective rate) = 10% per annum; US$1.00 = R$1.90
t+2: Selic (effective rate) = 9% per annum; US$1.00 R$1.80
t+3 (expiration date): Selic (effective rate) = 7% per annum; US$1.00

R$1.80

Fixed
leg US$
50,000.0
0

Net
Amount
Payable
US$ - each
period

Initial
Value US$

Selic

Initial
date
t+0

45,455.00

0.10

-

-

t+l

-

0.10

-0.05

50,000.0
0

52,273.25

t+2

-

0.09

-0.1

50,000.0
0

54,091.45

-1,818.20

-

0.07

-0.10

50,000.0
0

53,182.35

-1,364.15

t+3
(expirati
on date)
Total
settleme

t+3

Floating
leg US$

(BCB
receives
positive
amounts
and
pays
negative
ones)

-

Aeu

-2,273.25

-5,455.60

nt

These examples depict extreme situations to show, in theory, all the possibilities and
91
In practice, the counterparties have several
costs of the BCB FX swap operations.
opportunities to adjust their risk exposure in SCS contracts. The first opportunity appears

91 See supra tbl. 1-4.
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when the counterparties negotiate the IC, taking into consideration their preferences and
expectations. After that, risk exposure can be adjusted daily in the secondary market, where
the counterparties can negotiate SCS contracts based on the most recent information and
forecasts. Finally, risk exposure can also be mitigated when old contracts are rolled over. As
another auction occurs with the rollover operation, the counterparties have i new possibility
for negotiating the IC and for adjusting exposures based on changes in the economic scenario.
C.

Statistics

To finish this part dedicated to presenting the BCB FX swap, two sets of data are
displayed.92 The data offer a first glimpse into the size and significance of the swap
operations and also into the risks and costs involved. 93 Figure 1 shows a comparison between
the volume of the Brazilian FX reserves and the total volume of the BCB FX swaps in the
years that ended with the BCB holding a long position in interest rate and a short position in
U.S. dollars ("traditional swap"). 94 In these years, the BCB was offering liquidity to the
foreign-exchange market and, thus, performing an FX intervention that would be close to
selling U.S. dollars from the FX reserves in the spot market.9 5

BANcO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, MGMT. REP. (Jul. 4, 2013), https://www.bcb.gov.br/?RED-MGMTREPORT
(English Version) and http://www.bcb.gov.br/?RELADM (Portuguese Version). (Data collected from the
92

English version, from 2008 to 2012, and from the Portuguese version for the other years. All data used to create
Figures I and 2 are relative to December of each year. The value of the FX reserves takes into account only
cash assets. The aggregate notional amount of the BCB FX swaps states the net position of all contracts held at
the end of each year ["traditional" v. "reverse" swaps]. From 2005 to 2007, the BCB ended the years holding a
short position in interest rate ["reverse swap"], since the national currency was appreciating. In 2009 and 2010,
the aggregate notional amount of the BCB FX swaps was null, as the program was interrupted after the 2008
financial crisis, and in 2011 and 2012, that amount was equal to or smaller than US$2 billion, whereas the FX
reserves were greater than US$350 billion.)
93

id.

9

See infra fig. 1.

9

BANco CENTRAL DO BRASiL, MGMT. REP., supra note 92.
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Ftiure 2 displays~a view of the annual net results of the BCB F3X swaps, w~hich is a
usefbl indicator of the di'rt costs associated witoh the operation.to
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partcipates in swap operations to offer the market protction, soothe expectations, and
prevent excessive voltatility of the national crency, profit is not a prnmary goal
ho Bt the
costs of swap operations cant impose limitations if these costs cannot be properly managed or
ithey outweigh the benefits generated."
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The annual net results reveal that losses with BCB FX swap operations have been
relatively balanced against the positive results. Even in 2015, when the Brazilian currency
declined more than 47% (in nominal terms)-leading to the hugest negative annual result
since the BCB started using swaps in FX interventions, of approximately US$23 billion or
1.5% of Brazilian GDP-the losses were somewhat softened by the gains in 2016.103 Losses
in the swap operations, however, can have a significant fiscal cost.'" These losses contribute
to inflating the government's budget deficit since, for accounting purposes, the losses are
treated as part of Brazil's gross public debt (interest payments).'os
On the other hand, losses with BCB FX swaps, which are always denominated in the
6
national currency, can be eased by the appreciation of the FX reserves.o The budgetary
offset is possible because reserves are held in U.S. dollars, but are denominated in Brazilian
7
real in the BCB's balance sheet.'o While the BCB can lose in the swap operations when the
national currency is depreciating, as happened in 2014 and 2015, the FX reserves will
08
The
increase in value since the reserves have to be converted to the national currency.'
also
and
swaps
FX
the
BCB
with
losses
alleviate
thus,
can,
appreciation of the FX reserves
reduce the opportunity cost of holding FX reserves.io9
0
Yet, the final
Gains with FX reserves, however, do not have a direct fiscal effect.
of FX
volume
the
because
First,
sheet.
balance
BCB's
the
result will still be positive for
of
amount
notional
aggregate
of
the
volume
the
than
bigger
times
reserves is more than three
BCB
of
amount
notional
the
total
than
greater
loss
a
because
BCB FX swaps.' And second,
2
FX swaps is unlikely-although possible." All in all, if the BCB FX swap contributes to
cutting demand for U.S. dollars in the spot market and, in the end, to avoiding a decrease in
3
FX reserves, the swap can still be useful despite its relative costs."

103

10

See supra fig. 2.
Id.

1os For a critique of the BCB FX swaps and their fiscal repercussions, see Edmar Bacha, A Ponte do PMDB e
os Swaps do Banco Central[The PMDB Bridge and the BCB FX swaps], 0 Estado de S. Paulo (Braz.), Jan. 3,
2016, at B08.
'6 Under Lei No. 11.803, de 5 de Novembro de 2008, art. 6 D.O.U. de 6.11.2008 (Braz).
107 Id. Technically, the costs incurred because of the use of BCB FX swaps, and any other cost related to the
exchange-rate variation for that matter, will not stay in the BCB's balance sheet. These costs will be instead
transferred to the Treasury through an operation known as "equalizagflo cambial" (exchange-rate equalization).
10

See supra fig. 2.

About the opportunity cost of holding FX reserves, see, e.g., Dani Rodrik, The Social Cost of Foreign
Exchange Reserves, 20 INT'L EcON. J. no. 3, at 253 (2006).
no See Bacha, supranote 105.
'

ni See supra fig. 1.
112 See infra Part E, C.
113 Now that the features of the BCB FX swap are clearer, it is possible to note that this type of swap used by
the Central Bank of Brazil is different from the "swap lines" arranged between the U.S. Federal Reserve
(Fed)-through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York "acting at the direction of the Federal Open Market
Committee"-and certain foreign central banks to exchange U.S. dollars for the foreign currency. The main
purpose of the "swap lines" nowadays is to allow the Fed to provide foreign central banks with liquidity of U.S.
dollars so that they can meet the internal demand for the currency, especially in times of crisis. For a critique of
the swap lines, see Colleen M. Baker, The Federal Reserve's Use of InternationalSwap Lines, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. 603 (2013).
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IV.

FINDING THE PLACE OF BCB FX SWAPS IN THE WORLD OF DERIVATIVES

Organizing derivatives in categories and contrasting them are challenging missions
because flexibility is one of the core characteristics of derivatives.11 4 Derivatives can be
created, modified, or adjusted in different forms and to different ends. It is possible, however,
to identify certain features that all or most of derivatives have in common, and, in
consequence, to select some essential aspects to be considered when drawing comparisons. A
derivative can be defined"' as an instrument whose value is derived from the value or
variation of one or more underlying references, like an asset, index or even a situation, as the
"number of twins to be born in Nebraska in 2020.1I6
Derivatives are formalized in a contract and can be divided into four major
categories" ': forward contract, which is "an agreement between two parties to buy or sell an
asset at a specified future time, referred to as the delivery date, for a specified price;"" 8
futures contract, a standardized forward contract publicly traded on exchanges; 19 option,
which is "a contract that gives the owner the right to buy or sell an asset at a specified price
(termed the exercise or strike price) on or before a specified future date;" 2 0 and swap, "a
contract between two parties, referred to as counterparties, to exchange a series of cash flows
over time. (...) Swap payments are calculated on the basis of hypothetical quantities of the
underlying asset referred to as 'notionals."'l 2 1 The key feature usually associated with
derivatives is risk. For one thing, derivatives are used to manage risk as they allow market
participants to increase, limit or offset their level of exposure to risk and volatility depending
on the need for protection or inclination to pursue higher yields.1 22 But derivatives are also a
source of risk themselves, mainly because of leverage.123 When engaging in a derivatives
operation, a contracting party seldom has to make any initial payment when trading in the
over-the-counter ("OTC") markets.1 24 Even when trading on an organized exchange, a
counterparty usually has to pay only a small amount upfront (the initial margin or an option)
114 ALAN N. RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE LAW: EvoLUTION
AFTER CRISIS

153-54 (2014).
For other definitions of derivatives, see KALBAUGH, supra note 49, at 2; Krawiec, supra note 7, at 6-9;
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supranote 114, at 148.
116 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (2002), supra note 2,
at 13.
"

117

See Krawiec, supra note 7, at 9 (opting for a more straightforward organization, claiming that every

derivative is "based on one of two relatively simple models: the forward or the option," with "forward-based
derivatives" encompassing forward contracts, futures contracts, and swap transactions); KALBAUGH, supra note
49 at 2-9; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supranote 114, at 155-63.
118 See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch ofDerivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1,
7 (1996).
"' Id. at 10.
120 Id. at 40.
121

Id. at 46.

' See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 25-26 (1994); RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 148
123 RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at
153-54.
124 Although a counterparty in the OTC market can require collateral
to engage in a derivative operation, a
requirement that will represent the initial cost to the counterparty offering the collateral.
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relative to the notional value of the operation.125 This seemingly simple and inexpensive way
to establish a position in the derivatives market can, however, turn into a considerable loss.
The turn of events occurs when the variation of the value of the underlying reference is too
large, too abrupt, or different from the variation the market participant initially expected.126
Finally, the main distinction among derivatives takes into account whether they are
12 7
Exchange-traded derivatives are standardized contracts
traded and settled on an exchange.
"available for trading on a centralized exchange [and] for settlement with a clearing house
associated with the exchange." 2 8 Off-exchange derivatives, also labeled OTC derivatives,
29
OTC derivatives can, though, display some
are bilaterally negotiated, traded, and settled.1
degree of standardization when the contracting parties opt for using the model documentation
30
prepared and provided by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA").1
A.
1.

Differences of the BCB FX Swap

BCB FX Swap as a Policy Tool

The primary aim of the BCB in using FX swaps is to prevent instability in the
foreign-exchange market.' 3 By purchasing or selling SCS contracts, the BCB offers a hedge
to market participants against sudden currency volatility,132 trying to soothe expectations and
33
Here, a distinctive characteristic of the BCB
to reduce the pressure in the FX spot market.1
FX swap appears. By engaging in this derivative transaction, the BCB is not shifting risk to
its counterparties, the financial institutions that transact directly with the BCB and,
34
eventually, the financial and corporate markets.1 Instead, the BCB is taking risk out of these
markets and concentrating the risk in itself, so that the markets can operate more smoothly
without fear of abrupt exchange-rate variations. 1 As a consequence, the BCB also manages
the volatility of the national currency and protects currency stability, in a typical operation of
exchange-rate policy. In the end, the increased stability of the national currency can also
contribute to the stability of internal prices, with positive outcomes for monetary policy.

125

Id.

126 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., supra note 122, at 62.
127 KALBAUGH, supra note 49, at 9-10; Krawiec, supra note 7, at 7-8; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at

151-52.
128 KALBAUGH, supra note 49, at 9-10.
129
130
131
132

Id.
Id at 299-315.
Kohlscheen & Andrade, supra note 21, at 205.
Bevilaqua & Azevedo, supra note 21, at 124.

133 See BANCO CENTRAL Do BRASIL, INFLATION REP., supranote 12.

See Id
135 See BANCO CENTRAL DO BRAsE, INFLATION REP., supra note 12.
134

About the interaction between monetary and exchange-rate policies, see generally Sebastian Edwards, The
Relationship between Exchange Rates and Inflation Targeting Revisited (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12163, 2006), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2163; Andr6 Minella et al., Inflation
Targeting in Brazil: Constructing Credibility under Exchange Rate Volatility (Braz. Central Bank, Working
Paper No. 77, July 2003), https://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps77.pdf; and M S Mohanty and Philip
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Although the BCB FX swap involves a great deal of risk management, especially for
the counterparties contracting with the BCB, the swap operations are essentially a tool for
implementing exchange-rate and monetary policies, goals not typically associated with
derivatives. Another unique feature of the BCB FX swap is the presence of a governmental
agency as the leading counterparty in the derivatives operation. The BCB can hardly be seen
as just another counterparty in the world of exchange-traded derivatives.
2.

BCB as the Insider

When compared to other swap counterparties, the BCB has at least one ability that
no other counterparty has: the ability to influence, even if indirectly, the value of both
underlying references involved in the swap contract.'13 Under Brazil's inflation-targeting
regime, the BCB is authorized to set a short-term interest rate benchmark and to use monetary
tools to achieve this benchmark.
In this way, the BCB's decisions on monetary policy
directly influence the effective base interest rate. ' In other words, the BCB can legitimately
act to raise or decrease the effective base interest rate. 140 An identical situation occurs with.
the exchange rate. To implement the exchange-rate policy, the BCB, in addition to using
swap contracts, can also buy or sell U.S. dollars in the spot market, thereby directly affecting
the variation of the exchange rate.141
One of the counterparties, the BCB, can therefore, move the price of both references
that are used to determine the net obligation of the BCB FX swap, while the other
counterparty has no equivalent power.142 Is there a conflict of interest in the BCB FX swap?
This is likely not the case, as both the swap operations and the BCB's actions that could affect
the references used in the swaps are aspects of the same reality: the execution of monetary
and exchange-rate policies. Open-market operations, FX interventions in the spot market, and
BCB FX swap operations are just different tools used in different circumstances and at
different moments, but with a similar objective.1 43 Since these tools are interrelated, they
continuously influence and reinforce each other.
The BCB could even be forced to "bet against itself' in the derivatives market by
having to set a lower benchmark for the base interest rate even when facing a depreciation of
the national currency. If the BCB set a lower benchmark interest rate to avert a situation of

Turner, Intervention: what are the domestic consequences? (BIS Papers No. 24 at 56-81, 2005),

http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap24e.pdf.
137 Kohlscheen & Andrade, supra note 21, 9-12.
138 Id.
139 See Jose R. Alfonso, Eliane C. Araujo & Bernardo G. Fajardo, The role offiscal and monetary policies in
the Brazilian economy: understandingrecent institutionalreforms and economic changes, 62 THfE QUARTERLY
REvIEw OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 49 (2016), bttps://ac.els-cdn.com/S1062976916300527/1-s2.0Si 062976916300527-main.pdf? tid=aa7l4b6d-5565-4371 -a7a98ff338a5344d&acdnat-1 549646059_b78423eb5bffa5fl2a9e7al 9497bd703.

14o

Id.

Kohlscheen & Andrade, supra note 21, 202-16.
See Milan Nedeljkovic & Christian Saborowski, The Relative Effectiveness of Spot Derivatives
Based
Intervention: The Case ofBrazil 6-8 (IMF, Working Paper No. 17/11, 2016).
141

142

143

Kolscheen & Andrade, supra note 21.
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economic downturn, for instance, the position of the BCB in the "traditional swaps" would be
worsened. This hypothetical scenario is unlikely since the depreciation of the national
currency is often linked to rising inflation, a circumstance that would require the central bank
1
to raise the benchmark interest rate, not decrease it. " But this illustration demonstrates how
interrelated the BCB FX swap is with other monetary and exchange-rate tools.
The initial counterparties of the BCB FX swap are, moreover, sophisticated
financial institutions, which have the capacity and the means to analyze the available
information and fend for themselves. These financial institutions are, in fact, the first risk
takers, engaging in the swap operation with the BCB largely to offset their exposure to the
exchange-rate variation. 145 And financial institutions have this kind of exposure because they
are the ones who directly meet the market demand for hedging against the variation of the
national currency.146 Despite being a privileged counterparty, the BCB acts not to improve its
position or to obtain financial gains. but to implement public policies and also meet the
47
demand of the private counterparties.1
3.

BCB as the Elephant in the Room

The BCB is also an unusual counterparty when it comes to its relationship with the
exchange and the related clearinghouse where the BCB FX swap is traded, cleared, and
settled. Participants in an organized exchange have to comply not only with the applicable
legal framework, but also with the rules and prudential standards enacted by the exchange and
14 8
These rules and standards exist to reduce risk since the trades
the related clearinghouse.
cleared through a clearinghouse that acts as the central
are
exchange
an
on
that occur
As the central clearinghouse guarantees the
participants.
market
all
the
to
counterparty
in its obligations, counterparty risk is
defaults
counterparties
of
the
one
if
even
transactions
mitigated.149
The rules and prudential standards are enforced by the exchange and also by the
affiliated clearinghouse, which acts as a gatekeeper to the benefit of the entire clearing and
trading system. 50 Although exchanges originally developed those rules and standards in a
self-regulatory effort, national regulators have been creating sets of minimum regulatory
51
The U.S. Commodity
responsibilities that exchanges and clearinghouses must observe.1
Futures Trading Commission, for example, has issued a set of core principles that exchanges
and clearinghouses must observe to obtain or maintain the status of a registered trading
facility or a clearing organization.152

" Id.
Kolscheen & Andrade, supranote 21.

145

146 BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, INFLATION REP., supra note
147

12.

Id.

'" JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 6, at495, 530-36

149 Id. at 189-91, 490-94. See also RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 155-63, 151-52.
Iso JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 6, at 174-78, 189-95, 536-42.
"s' Id at 530-36.

See 77 FR § 36611 (2012) (Core Principles And Other Requirements For Designated Contract Markets) and
76 FR § 69334 (2012) (Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles).
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The question here is how effectively an organized exchange can require compliance
with its rules when one of the participants is a central bank. Some sets of rules create
challenging situations for the exchange dealing with a central bank. First, the rules related to
position limitations, or rules that allow the exchange to limit the trade volume of a market
participant for each contract to prevent excessive or abusive trading.' As the BCB held
100% of the open interest in all the more than two million FX swap contracts outstanding at
the end of 2015,154 the exchange could have decided to limit the position of the BCB on this
contract owing to excessive trading. But such a limitation could have been seen as an undue
interference of the exchange in the implementation of public policies.
It is also problematic the requirement that the exchange continuously presents
adequate capitalization to have enough financial resources to perform its functions and cover
the operating costs. 15 5 Because of the size of the BCB FX swaps, and the risk concentration
inherent in the operation, the exchange could be considered unprepared to face billion-dollar
losses that an unlikely, yet still possible, default of the BCB could motivate. 156 Here, two
qualifications are required: one, the aggregate notional amount of the BCB FX swaps will
rarely materialize into a net amount of the same value since the operation is structured to be
cash settled based on the differential between the fixed and the floating leg.'
Furthermore,
the biggest negative annual result occurred in 2015-a total loss of approximately US$23
billion at the time.1 5 8 This loss was equivalent to 21.3% of the aggregate notional amount
outstanding at the end of that year,1 59 a relative amount that may be a better indicator of the
ultimate risk associated with the BCB FX swap.
Finally, regarding the enforcement powers of the exchange, it would be challenging
for the exchange, a private entity, to sanction' 6 0 the central bank, a governmental agency, on
the grounds of a rule violation. The situation would be even more complicated if the conflict
were not settled, and an independent court had to solve the disagreement. In this case,
difficult questions about jurisdiction and governing law would arise, especially because the
participation of a governmental agency in arbitration proceedings--the usual method of
solving disputes with the exchange-is debated.161

155

JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 6, 417-20.

'

BM&FBOVESPA, supra note 19.

..
s Bergljot B. Barkbu & Li Lian Ong, FX Swaps: Implicationsfor Financialand Economic Stability 13-14
(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/55, 2010).
156 See infra Part m, C.
1s7 See supra Part II, B (The notional amount of the contract
would only turn into a net amount of the same
value in the extreme circumstance that the exchange-rate variation were greater than 100% in the period and
big enough to wipe off the value of the effective base interest rate).
15 Maryse Farhi, Foreign Exchange Derivatives and Financial Fragility
in Brazil, in THE BRAZILIAN
ECONOMY SINCE THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007/2008 330 (Philip Arestis et al. eds., 2017).

1' Press Release, Fiscal Policy Data Released - January 2016, BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL
(Feb. 26, 2016).
16 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 6, 548-54 (About the sanctioning powers of organized exchanges).
161 See Kirby Behre, Arbitration:A Permissibleor DesirableMethodfor Resolving Disputes
Involving Federal
Acquisition and Assistance Contracts?, 16 PUB. CONT. L. J. 66 (1986); Robert Braucher, Arbitration Under
Government Contracts, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473 (1952).
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These illustrations show how difficult it can be for the exchange to enforce riskcontrol measures when one of the counterparties is a central bank. The BCB is not just
another counterparty in the BM&Fbovespa, since the BCB is also executing public policies
under the authority of the Constitution and the related legal framework. Unless clear
exemptions are established in the internal rules and the appropriate statutes, the exchange
could be left in a difficult position. The exchange would have to deal with one counterparty
that is not in compliance with the applicable rules, but, at the same time, that cannot be
effectively required to do so or, otherwise, to take responsibility for the potential violations.
B.

The BCB FX Swap is Not a Futures Contract in Disguise

The "traditional swap," in which the BCB purchases contracts, is quite often
16 2
In fact, some swap
described as a sale of U.S. dollars in the futures market by the BCB.
futures.1 6 3 Swap
commodities
particularly,
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of
as
a
series
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or
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vanilla"
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"plain
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when
strong
perception is particularly
(the
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principal
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of
the
exchange
actual
the
even a basic FX swap involving
two currencies) at the beginning and end of the transaction. 165
But comparing the "traditional swap" to a futures contract in which the BCB sells
U.S. dollars in the future at a pre-agreed price is misleading. The comparison fails to
appreciate the relevance of the interest rate variation during the term of the BCB FX swap
contract, as this variation can mitigate or even neutralize a depreciation of the national
currency. If searching for an equivalent is relevant, the BCB FX swap would be closer to the
selling of a Brazilian government security denominated in U.S. dollars. The net payments of
the BCB FX swap are influenced not only by the exchange-rate variation-which determines
the outcome of a typical cash-settled FX futures or swap 66- but also by the value of the
correspondent interest rates. 167
The BCB FX swap represents, therefore, a contract between two parties (the BCB
and the private counterparties) to exchange a series of cash flows over time based on the
variation of underlying references (the "notionals"), which are represented by the fixed and
the floating legs. 16 But which type of swap is it? The BCB FX swap is similar to a crosscurrency swap, also referred to as cross-currency basis swap, or cross-currency interest rate

162

Kohlscheen & Andrade, supra note 21.

163 KALBAUGH, supra note 49, at 6.
'64 Romano, supra note 118, at 49.
165 Romano, supra note 118, at 46-68. As Romano observes, even if a "taxonomy of generic derivatives could

include swaps as a species of forward contract," it would still be helpful "to distinguish swap contracts for two
reasons. First, swaps are not truly a redundant instrument" since they have lower transaction costs and higher
liquidity than forward contracts. "Second, the swap market has been a principal focus of current regulatory
concern." Id. at 49.
166 KALBAUGH, supra note 49, at 13; see also RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 170-71.
167 See BANCO CENTRAL DO BRAsIL, INFLATION REP., supranote 12, at 53-55. See also Bevilaqua & Azevedo,

supra note 21, at 124; Kohlscheen & Andrade, supra note 21, at 10.
168 Romano supra note 118, at 46.
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swap, which "operates like an interest rate swap between two currencies"16 9 and has the
following mechanics:
At the onset of the swap, one party ("Party A") provides a principal amount of a
currency ("X") in exchange for a principal amount of another currency ("Y") from
the other party ("Party B"). These amounts could be the actual amounts or notional
equivalents depending on what the parties have agreed. On a periodic basis, Party A
pays Party B interest on Y in exchange for the receipt of interest on X from Party B.
The interest could be fixed, based on a floating reference, or one leg could be fixed
and the other floating. At maturity, the parties return to each other (physically or
notionally, as agreed) the principal exchanged at the onset of the swap. 70
The BCB FX swap is organized somewhat differently, but the final result is similar
to the result of a cross-currency swap."' First, the counterparties are notionally exchanging a
principal amount of one currency, U.S. dollars, for a principal amount of another currency,
Brazilian real. Although no initial exchange of-principal occurs, the BCB FX swap is
denominated in U.S. dollars, but the daily adjustment of positions and the final settlement are
made with the use of the national currency, Brazilian real. This arrangement creates an
outcome that is similar to the result obtained by exchanging different currencies.
Second, two different interest rates, one fixed and one floating, are also exchanged
in the BCB FX swap. The fixed rate is the Initial Coupon, which the counterparties negotiate
during the auction of the SCS contracts and is used only once, to discount the principal
amount in U.S. dollars (US$50,000.00) and to form the Initial Value of the SCS contract. The
floating rate .is the Current Coupon, which is calculated for each period beginning on the
initial date of the transaction. The Current Coupon is used to index the Initial Value and to
set the value of the daily adjustment of positions, also influencing the final settlement of the
net obligation.172
C.

The BCB FX Swap is Not a Risk-Free Derivative

The BCB FX swap also raises distinctive questions regarding the risks it generates.
At first glance, the BCB FX swap seems to be a risk-free derivative. Not only is the swap
traded on a registered exchange for settlement within a clearinghouse, but all swap payments
are made using the national currency. And a central bank is not expected to default on
financial obligations denominated in the national currency since the central bank could
73
always issue more money-in fact, more reserves into the banks' reserve accounts.
Inflationary pressure could, though, be a side effect and, eventually, a limitation.174 A

'" KALBAUGH, supra note 49, at 14.
170

id.

171 See supra Part II, B.
172 Id.
173 See Franco,supra note
9, at 58.
174 See, e.g., Robert E. Hall & Ricardo Reis, MaintainingCentral-Bank FinancialStability under New-Style
Central Banking (2015),
http://personal.1se.ac.uk/reisr/papers/99-HallReissolvency.pdf; Peter Stella, Do
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comprehensive analysis of distinct categories of financial risks will, however, demonstrate
that the first impression is not one that should last.
Credit risk is greatly eliminated in exchange-traded derivatives because the
clearinghouse associated with the exchange acts as the central counterparty to all market
participants, guaranteeing each contract against a counterparty's default."5 Moreover, the
"clearinghouse itself is less likely to default than any individual trading partner, (...) because
of exchange-imposed margin and mark-to-market requirements, as well as the loss-sharing
76
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policies. 78 As the counterparties are sophisticated, they can control risk exposure based on
their predictions and expectations, although unforeseen events can increase volatility in
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Liquidity risk'8 ' tends to be low in the BCB FX swap. First, because the BCB FX
swap is exchange-traded and based on a standardized contract, the SCS contract, features that
make it easier for the counterparties to negotiate swap contracts in the secondary market.
Second, because the settlement currency of the BCB FX swap is Brazilian real, and the BCB
82
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Central Banks Need Capital?, (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9783.pdf.
173 Krawiec, supranote 7, at 32-33; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 151-52.
176 RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 152.

97/83,

1997),

177 Krawiec, supranote 7, at 17-20; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 154-55.

17' Dodd & Griffith-Jones, supra note 21.
179 See GAO FINANcIAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 122, at 62.
'so Id.

181 Krawiec, supranote 7, at 1-63; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 356.
1g2 C.F. art. 164.
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bank is to act as a lender of last resort,' 83 the BCB FX swap should remain liquid even under
extreme circumstances.
Operationalrisk'8 should not be a major concern in the BCB FX swap either. As
the counterparties involved in the operation are sophisticated, and all trades are made on an
organized exchange, it would be surprising if one of the counterparties attributed losses to
inadequate understanding or management of the transaction-or to any other failure related to
internal controls. Nonetheless, operational failure can emerge even in institutions that have a
reputation for efficient internal controls, largely owing to single "rogue traders" who go
unchecked for a time.18 5
Legal risk'86 should be insignificant since the BCB has an explicit and clear legal
mandate to engage in swap transactions to implement monetary and exchange-rate policies.
The legal mandate was, however, questioned, and a case was brought before the Tribunal de
Contas da Uniaio ("TCU"), which is the Brazilian equivalent of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office ("GAO"). During the procedure, which started at the beginning of
2003 and ended in mid-2007, the TCU investigated allegations of lack of proper legal
authority for the BCB to use swaps and to operate like any other counterparty on the
designated exchange; of failure in the execution of the exchange-rate policy because of the
significant losses the BCB FX swaps caused; and of a potential violation of legal
requirements related to fiscal responsibility.' 8 7 In the end, the TCU, at a plenary session held
on June 27, 2007, rejected all the allegations and closed the investigation.'" The procedure
serves, however, as a reminder that the capacity of a public-sector entity to enter into a
derivative contract remains a critical and quite often disputed issue. 9
Politicalrisk 90 is also at stake since the leading counterparty of the BCB FX swap
is a governmental agency. Political risk, here, means the risk that a change in the political
and institutional situation of the country leads the central bank to change its attitude towards
the swap operations and to breach past agreements. Political risk would be harmful because it
could unfold risks that are otherwise insignificant to the BCB FX swap. Political risk could
eventually create sovereign risk,191 the risk that the BCB would be unwilling or unable to
meet swap obligations. It. follows that in the unlikely event that the BCB defaulted in the
exchange-traded swap operations, the clearinghouse associated with the exchange would have
to guarantee the performance of all the BCB FX swaps outstanding. The clearinghouse would

183 See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN & STANLEY G. EAKINS, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 180-84

(6th

ed. 2009).
184 Krawiec, supra note 7, at 39; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 353-61.
1ss Krawiec, supra. note 7, at 39-45.
Krawiec, supra note 7, at 35-39; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 114, at 255-356; Romano, supra note 118, at
52-54.
187 See TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DA UNIAO, Processo No. TC-012.015/2003-0 (Representaqfo), Ac6rdko No.
1278/2007 (DecisSo do Plendrio), Relator: Ministro Marcos Vinicios Rodrigues Vilaga, 27.6.2007 (Braz.) (on
file with author).
186

188 Id.

189 Romano, supra note 118, at 52-54

'0 See Claire A. Hill, How Investors React To PoliticalRisk, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 283 (1998); and
Stephen J. Kobrin, PoliticalRisk: A Review and Reconsideration, 10 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 67 (1979).
191 Id.
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be able to use the margin collected from the BCB before the default to absorb part of the
losses. But given the size of the BCB FX swap operations, the clearinghouse would still be
left with a considerable financial obligation.
Systemic riskl92 could, therefore, be the final step of this inconceivable turn of
events. As the BM&FBovespa operates in a natural-monopoly situation,193 and
94
clearinghouses can be sources of systemic risk themselves because of risk concentration,
the financial and capital markets could be affected in the end. This hypothetical scenario is
certainly extreme and remote. However, the scenario illustrates the importance of a proper
risk assessment when designing and implementing a derivative instrument for central banks to
use.
V.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CENTRAL-BANK SWAPS

IN

FX

INTERVENTIONS

The BCB FX swap is a derivative developed by an unusual counterparty, the BCB,
to serve a unique purpose, the execution of public policies. This swap carries some
distinctive questions about legitimacy as well as risk. The BCB FX swap falls, thus, into a
seldom explored category of the derivatives world: the category of central-bank derivatives.
As Franco notes, central-bank interventions using derivatives should not come as a surprise.
At least since the 1990s, "[c]urrency forwards and swaps are widely used worldwide as
instruments of foreign-exchange intervention and monetary policy. Futures and options are
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otherwise borne by counterparties is concentrated in the clearinghouse, such that the clearinghouse becomes a
'singular point of failure.' (footnote omitted) In this conception, the clearinghouse is a source of systemic
risk-the failure of a clearinghouse would lead to losses for all members that were exposed to the
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195 Franco, supra note 9, at 56.
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of FX reserves; and (3) China trying to control the depreciation of the renminbi in 2015 and
2016.
First, the case of Switzerland is emblematic, although other countries, like Denmark
and Sweden, have faced a similar challenge.19'
Since 2011, the Swiss National Bank
("SNB") was trying to control the strengthening of the Swiss franc. Owing to the dismal
economic performance of the Euro-Area, and in anticipation of the European quantitative
easing policy, more investors had flocked to the Swiss franc, which is considered a "safe
haven." To avoid the appreciation of the franc, the SNB had tried pegging the franc to the
euro, but the costs to keep the exchange-rate peg have taken their toll.' 98 In January 2015, the
SNB, in a surprising decision, abandoned its policy of capping the Swiss franc to the euro.'m
The costs, however, of letting the Swiss franc suddenly float without restrictions were also
considerable. 200
Under this scenario, and knowing that the SNB might have used derivatives in FX
interventions before, 2 0 1 could the SNB have used FX swaps to help curb excessive volatility
of the Swiss currency? The SNB could have used "reverse swaps" to ease the appreciation of
the Swiss franc. SNB counterparties engaging in a "reverse swap" would have had a strong
incentive against the appreciation of the Swiss franc. The counterparties would have gained if
the currency had stayed stable and even greater gains if the currency had depreciated, as long
as the Swiss effective base interest rate had remained neutral or slightly positive. Ultimately,
SNB counterparties would have held a Swiss franc-denominated credit, finding there a
cherished yet synthetic "safe haven."
Would the synthetic "safe haven" have been enough to discourage market
participants from buying currency in the spot market? Because most of the participants were
looking for safety, they could have seen the underlying asset as more valuable than the
protection offered by the corresponding derivative, ignoring the swaps altogether. This
perception would have posed additional difficulties to the SNB. On the other hand, if most of
the market participants decided to follow the SNB's move to engage in the derivatives
transaction, another problem could have arisen. Since the Swiss franc is a convertible
202
currency,
the aggregate notional amount of the swaps could have become so large that it

See Mark Gilbert, Currency Wars Have a Nuclear Option, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 12, 2015),
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would have rendered the swap operations unmanageable, because of the excessive risk
exposure for the SNB.
Second, the complex interaction between a derivative instrument and its underlying
references also appears when contemplating the usefulness of central-bank FX swaps for
2 4
countries like Argentina2 0 3 or Venezuela. 0 In the mid-2010s, these countries were dealing
with the instability of their national currencies while holding a low level of FX reserves. The
"traditional swap" would be the suitable tool since the usual problem would be the persistent
depreciation of the national currency. Because the net payments of central-bank FX swaps
would be made with the use of the national currency, the aggregate notional amount of the
swaps would not have to be limited by the volume of the existing FX reserves. Assuming that
205
leverage would play a positive role in widening the
a liquid market for the swaps existed,
scope of the intervention in the FX market. Leverage would also allow these countries to
extend monetary and exchange-rate policies beyond the limitations the size of FX reserves
typically impose.2 06
The volume of FX reserves held by a country, however, would still be relevant since
using FX swaps involves a great deal of controlling expectations. And expectations could
only be controlled if market participants were confident that the central bank had the means to
20 7
If,
execute its policies and to respond swiftly to changing demands of the market.
of
of
confidence
lack
by
a
caused
were
currency
national
of
the
depreciation
the
moreover,
centralcountries,
of
those
situation
and
macroeconomic
political
the
in
market participants
bank FX swaps would have a limited effect. These swaps are not designed to directly solve
balance of payment issues, like massive capital outflows, but to offer an alternative for market
participants in need of hedging.208 For countries dealing with a low level of FX reserves,
though, every initiative with the potential to prevent the depletion of reserves would still be
invaluable.
Finally, even for China, the country with the largest FX reserves in the world, the
central-bank FX swap could have offered some help. Since 2015, the renminbi was suffering
from a sharp depreciation pressure because of a combination of slower economic growth,
declining exports, growing public and private debt, and massive capital outflows. In early
2016, the Chinese currency hit a five-year low, despite all the efforts of the People's Bank of

At the beginning of 2016, before the massive bond issuance in April, Argentina held less than $23 billion in
See Argentina: International Reserves/Foreign Currency Liquidity, IMF,
foreign reserves.
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(reporting that
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy-exclusive-idUSKCNOVElAT
"around 64 percent of Venezuela's $15.4 billion in foreign reserves were held in gold bars").
205 About the importance of a liquid derivatives market for interventions in the FX market through central-bank
swaps, see Garcia & Volpon, supranote 10, at 4-8.,
206 On the leveraged effect of foreign-exchange derivatives on the spot market, and the possibilities they open
for central-bank intervention, see Franco, supranote 9, at 57-58.
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China ("PBOC") to manage the sudden depreciation.2 0 9 The PBOC was selling as much as
$100 billion monthly from the FX reserves without being able to curb the volatility of the
national currency.2o Since mid-2014, the Chinese FX reserves may have dropped by almost
$1 trillion.2 1 1
Although Chinese reserves remained above $3 trillion in 2016,212 the volume and
pace of the decline could reinforce bets against the currency, creating a vicious circle that
would aggravate monetary and financial instability.2 The situation was so dire that even the
International Monetary Fund abandoned its decades-long position against capital controls and
started acknowledging that some control would be needed for emerging economies to limit
money flows and manage currency volatility.214 A model based on the "traditional swap"
would, then, have offered the PBOC one more option to avoid the fast depletion of the FX
reserves. Central-bank FX swaps could have been used to soften the pressure on the national
currency in the spot market, particularly if speculation-and not necessarily the will to send
money abroad-had motivated some of the foreign-currency purchases in the spot market.
These final thoughts and the related conundrums illustrate how the subject of
central-bank derivatives still offers plenty of room for exploration and debate. After all,
derivatives may also be financial weapons of maximal stability, useful tools that central banks
should keep close at hand.
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